Wang Fuk Court fire

On 26 November 2025, a large fire broke out at the Wang Fuk Court apartment complex in Tai Po District, New Territories, Hong Kong, and burned for 43 hours and 27 minutes. Seven out of the eight blocks of the complex were consumed by the fire. The incident killed 168 people, including one firefighter, and injured 79. Most casualties were found inside their apartments. It is the first five-alarm fire in Hong Kong since the 2008 Cornwall Court fire and the deadliest fire accident in Hong Kong since the 1948 Wing On warehouse fire, which resulted in 176 deaths.

At the time of the fire, the apartment complex was undergoing major repairs to the exterior walls of all eight residential towers. Bamboo scaffolding was erected to the full height of the buildings and was wrapped in construction safety nets and tarps. As early as 14:00 HKT (UTC+08:00) at Wang Cheong House (Block F), the safety netting covering the lower floors was ignited. Flammable expanded polystyrene foam (Styrofoam) boards covering the windows acted as potential accelerants for the fire, which quickly spread inside the building and then to the adjacent blocks.

Background

Wang Fuk Court

Wang Fuk Court is a subsidised government Home Ownership Scheme housing complex located in Tai Po, which is part of the Tai Po District in the New Territories, Hong Kong. The estate was built in 1983 and has eight residential blocks, each 31 storeys tall with nearly 2,000 units in total. They are among the tallest buildings in Tai Po. According to the 2021 population census, there were 4,643 residents in the complex. Data from the same census showed that nearly 40% of the residents were senior citizens aged 65 and above.

An inspection in 2016 mandated large-scale repairs for the estate. In January 2024, the owners' corporation presented three repair plans, with costs ranging from HK$150 million (US$19.31 million) to HK$330 million (US$42.47 million). The first two plans, both estimated at HK$150 million, were either to repair only the damaged parts of the exterior with tessera tiles, or to repair the damaged parts and apply waterproof paint. The third plan, which was eventually chosen, was estimated at HK$330 million and entailed completely rebuilding the exterior walls and paving them with tessera. The registered contractor was Prestige Construction and Engineering Company. The project's structural engineering consultancy was provided by Will Power Architects Company Limited, whose two directors were arrested after the fire by the ICAC in connection with suspected corruption during the renovations. In June 2024, Prestige could not source the original tessera tiles and switched to ceramic tiles.

Prestige Construction had a prior history of safety violations. The company was convicted of two safety offences in a project in the Mid-Levels in November 2023, and was fined three times in 2023 for separate violations totalling HK$30,000. A shareholder of the company was imprisoned in 2009 for bribing the Housing Society. Prior to the fire, the Labour Department had conducted 16 inspections of the site since July 2024, with the final inspection occurring just one week before the fire. Three prosecutions had been initiated and six improvement notices issued during this period.

At the time of the fire, all eight buildings of the complex were enveloped in bamboo scaffolding and green safety netting for external renovation. Furthermore, the interior windows of each floor's elevator room and all exterior windows had been sealed with flammable polystyrene.

There had been a renovation in the past year prior to the fire, and an investigation has been launched into suspected corruption related to the renovation.

Bamboo scaffolding and construction safety netting

In 2025, several fires occurred in Hong Kong that were related to structures with bamboo scaffolding encased in construction safety nets, including one at Texaco Road, Tsuen Wan in February, and in October at Chinachem Tower in Central, at the Casa Delight construction site, and at a University of Hong Kong dormitory.

Bamboo scaffolding is typically used in Hong Kong building construction and maintenance. According to a January 2025 estimate by industry representatives, nearly 80% of scaffolding in Hong Kong was bamboo-based. The chairperson of the Hong Kong Institution of Safety Practitioners, Lee Kwong-sing, stated that bamboo scaffolding and fire-retardant netting that meets government requirements are not easily ignited, and that the main cause of such fires is usually the presence of a large amount of debris, which can readily combust when exposed to sparks generated during the construction process. The Labour Department made several inspections of the construction site and found that the safety nets were certified to meet flame retardant standards.

While the Labour Department has issued safety guidelines that stipulate that the netting used with bamboo scaffolding must meet certain flame-retardant requirements, the guidelines have no legal effects or ramifications if ignored. Flame-retardant netting used in a scaffolding of 18 metres (59 ft) by 2 m (6.6 ft) would cost HK$90 (US$11.58) and has to be disposed after a single use due to the flame retardant properties degrading under the sun due to UV and environmental exposure, while an ordinary netting without fire retardancy would cost HK$50 (US$6.44) and is reusable. Consequently, some construction sites may have opted to use ordinary netting without flame retardancy as a cost-saving measure.

On 17 March 2025, government authorities announced that they would begin to phase out the use of bamboo and replace it with metal scaffolding, stating that bamboo deteriorates over time, has contributed to 23 deaths in scaffolding-related accidents since 2018, and is combustible. After the Chinachem Tower fire, the Buildings Department issued a statement urging enhanced flame-retardant standards for construction safety nets used for exterior walls at construction sites.

Other potential contributory factors

Residents had alleged as early as September 2024 that the construction workers had been smoking, littering cigarette butts throughout the construction site. A former security staff also claimed that as early as May 2025, he had found the fire alarm system intentionally turned off so that workers could enter and exit buildings more conveniently. Authorities also suspected that some materials on the exterior bamboo walls did not meet fire resistance standards, allowing the fast spread of the fire. The construction safety netting enclosed the buildings in a manner that created a chimney effect, promoting strong upward convection, fuelling rapid fire growth. Additionally, some of the windows in stairs were converted from glass to wood, so that workers could enter and exit the exterior more conveniently.

On the day of the fire, Hong Kong was affected by the northeast monsoon season. The weather was dry with strong winds. The relative humidity recorded in the district area for that afternoon was 40% to 50%. A Red Fire Danger Warning was issued by the Hong Kong Observatory on 24 November due to dry conditions; it remained in effect on the day of the fire.

Fire

Early signs

The fire is believed to have started from the safety netting covering the lower floors of Wang Cheong House (Block F). As early as 14:00 HKT (UTC+08:00) on 26 November 2025, signs of a fire at Wang Cheong House (Block F) first appeared when a resident at Wang Shing House (Block G) smelled smoke through her window. Through a gap in the mesh, she spotted a small flame burning in an apartment unit in Block F and attempted to contact the property management office to no avail. She then went down to the ground floor, only to be told by the security guard at the lift lobby that there was a fire. She went back to her apartment unit and sheltered in place until she was rescued. By 14:45, there were more eyewitness reports of the bamboo scaffolding along the exterior walls of Wang Cheong House having caught fire. Seen in the first video posted on social media, a bystander outside repeatedly shouted in dismay that there was no fire alarm.

Spread

The fire department received the first report of a fire at 14:51; firefighters arrived in ten minutes, but the fire had already escalated rapidly. The police received reports from passersby at around 15:00 and subsequently more calls from residents who reported that they were unable to escape. Some residents stated that they did not hear the fire alarm sirens even though they had broken the fire alarm glass and pressed the button; it was later determined that none of the fire alarms had activated in all of the eight towers. Other residents were notified of the fire through communication groups and neighbours knocking on doors.