Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls

The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) was established in 1949 at the beginning of the Cold War to coordinate controls on exports from Western Bloc countries to the Soviet Union and its allies. Operating through informal consensus, CoCom maintained extensive control lists covering arms, nuclear materials, and dual-use technologies. However, CoCom faced criticism for weak enforcement and inconsistent application among member states. CoCom officially disbanded on March 31, 1994. However, many of its export restrictions remained in effect among member nations until they were formally replaced by the Wassenaar Arrangement in 1996. CoCom's legacy continues to influence contemporary export control regimes, highlighting its enduring relevance in nonproliferation and technology policy.

Origins and historical context

CoCom originated from the tense geopolitical atmosphere following World War II, as Western nations grew increasingly wary of advanced technology potentially reaching the Soviet Bloc. This concern spurred efforts to collaborate on limiting technology transfers to communist states. Many of these concerns stemmed from America’s substantial technological investment in Japan during the 1930s, which helped Japan build East Asian industrial power ahead of WWII. As Japan grew to one of the U.S.'s primary adversaries in the World War II, many policymakers thus felt these policies were necessary to prevent the growth of powers challenging U.S. dominance. Thus, in response to the Soviet Union’s first nuclear test in 1949, the United States, United Kingdom, and France pursued confidential discussions to lay the groundwork for coordinated communist bloc export embargoes. These proposed restrictions were part of the broader Cold War strategy of containment, a tactic that aimed to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining access to industrial and computing technologies that would support its greater military and economic goals. These discussions resulted in a covert “gentlemen’s agreement” establishing CoCom in late 1949, with operations beginning in early 1950. CoCom was never formalized by treaty and operated informally, relying on unanimous consent for decisions, which limited its enforceability. Consequently, the U.S. enacted the Battle Act in 1951 to encourage participation, threatening to cut aid to allies that traded with communist nations. This attempt to steer the agenda fell short, as the relative warming of diplomatic relations through detente, coupled with the rapidly expanding economies of Europe and Japan becoming more intertwined with Eastern Europe, increased pressure on the United States to ease CoCom restrictions during the 1960s and 70s.

From the perspective of the Communist Bloc, CoCom was viewed as a discriminatory barrier to peaceful technology exchange. Theft as a means of technology transfer began to take place alongside limited technology transfers allowed to take place. However, this held significant disadvantages for the Soviets, as users were disconnected from Western manufacturers, and documentation of hardware was often unreliable. Thus, there were many within the Western bloc that felt that CoCom restrictions should be relaxed, in order to encourage reforms and promote peace. American computer scientist John McCarthy argued that the West needed to sell the Soviet regime on the advantages of rejoining the global order—through which Western technologies would be useful.

In the 1980s, renewed concerns about Soviet technological gains and competitive pressures in global markets revived interest in CoCom. With the United States facing more global technological development competition, European nations questioned the strict export restrictions and often lax enforcement, criticizing the U.S.-driven trade limitations as inconsistent and politically motivated. These concerns reinvigorated discussions of CoCom as a vital tool for controlling technology access to the Soviets and their allies, prompting meetings throughout the 1980s that reaffirmed member commitments to the CoCom. Nearly all countries in NATO joined CoCom by the late 1980s, and CoCom expanded its operations to add military advisors to advise on certain technologies and tighten licensing and enforcement measures. These initiatives laid the foundation for enhancing the reliability and effectiveness of the CoCom organization.

Membership

In its final years, CoCom had 17 member states:

Despite being neutral, Switzerland joined the CoCom sanctions against the Eastern bloc countries; see Hotz-Linder-Agreement.

Laws and regulations

In the United States, CoCom compliance was implemented via multiple statutes authorizing presidential export controls, including the Export Control Act of 1949, the Export Administration Act of 1969, the Export Administration Act of 1979, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the Trading with the Enemy Act, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, among others. Many of these statutes encouraged the coordination of controls with allies. However, U.S. policies frequently exceeded CoCom’s collective controls, reinforcing American leadership but also creating friction with allies. The Department of State and the Department of Commerce administered these coordinated controls via the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

Effectiveness and impact

CoCom’s export control lists were elaborate, specific, and systematically organized. CoCom had three categories of export controls: the Nuclear List—spanning uranium enrichment systems and nuclear reactor components; the International Munitions List—including guided missiles, advanced avionics, and other strategic military systems; and the Industrial List—containing dual-use items such as supercomputers and semiconductors. These lists were updated regularly—in 1954, 1958, 1961, 1964, 1967, 1971, and 1974-1975—to reflect evolving geopolitical dynamics between CoCom constituents and the USSR. President George H.W. Bush’s successful proposal to eliminate a significant number of industrial and dual-use CoCom export controls following the fall of the Berlin Wall and diminishing Soviet influence in Eastern Europe reflects CoCom’s adaptability.Moreover, in 1992, CoCom members collectively agreed to expand membership to the former USSR. The longevity of CoCom—lasting 30 years despite military risks that threatened its abolition—is also notable.

Yet enforcement was weak and export control lists were often ambiguous. First, with only 14 staff in the 1980s, CoCom lacked robust inspection or sanction mechanisms. Disagreements over what constituted “dual-use” technology created ambiguity, causing poor export control enforcement. Second, CoCom not only lacked large fines for violators but was also unable to impose sanctions against them. Third, there were frequent complaints about American hypocrisy within CoCom—using export control mechanisms to delay competitors’ deals while greenlighting similar U.S. exports. European countries pointed out that since the U.S. controlled the reexport licensing system, American corporations could evade U.S. credit restrictions by exporting through European subsidiaries while simultaneously delaying French exports, giving American corporations a commercial advantage. Specifically, non-American CoCom members felt that U.S. policies on East-West technology transfers were both volatile and politically driven, pointing to President Carter’s reversal of a denied export license for Sperry-Univac, an American corporation, to the Soviet Union—potentially because the U.S. sought a competitive advantage after deterring non-American CoCom members from pursuing similar deals.

Fourth, the Industrial List included “dual-use” items—goods, services, and technologies that could be deployed for both commercial and military use; however, the definition of what qualifies as “dual-use” became increasingly ambiguous. For examples, American companies exporting civilian telecommunications satellites relied upon Chinese military rockets, raising concerns about how technology transfers could enhance China’s missile capabilities. Much of the opposition against CoCom revolved around whether market competition was a sufficient deterrent against exporting high-tech items to adversaries. Many European officials believed that potential competition and the risk of losing a comparative advantage would be a sufficient safeguard against Western technology transfers to the Soviets. Ultimately, Cold War's end weakened the rationale for CoCom, leading to its disbandment.

Soviet Union's reception and resistance

For the most part, the Soviet Union viewed CoCom not merely as a Western mechanism to restrict trade but also as a strategic tool employed by the West to impede the USSR's technological and economic development. From the Soviet standpoint, CoCom was an extension of Cold War hostilities. While never formally acknowledged in public by the Soviet leadership, CoCom was frequently denounced in internal party discussion and through state-aligned media as an economic warfare mechanism designed to stunt socialist development and prove capitalist technological superiority.